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The Dubious Success of Export
Subsidies for Wheat
N MAY 15, 1985, the U.S. Depan’tment ofAgr-
culture intm’oduced an export subsidy program
called the Expomt Enhancement Pi-ogram (EEP).
The progr’amnn’s mnnaimn goal is to increase U.S. agri-
cultur-al expor-ts.’ ‘The pr’ogr-am also is intemnded to
induce European Community EC) r-eductions in
agr-icultural subsidies during the cun’r-entr-ound of
nnultilateral tr’ade negotiations under- the Gener-al
Agm’eennemnt on Tar ifs amnd Trade (GAiT).
Although the EI3P focuses on exports and trade
pohicies~ it is a direct outgrowth of the donnestic
fan-mn policies of tine United States amnd the Euro-
pean Community. i’he above-market pm-ice guam-an-
tees of tinese policies have resulted imn surplus
production. ‘To dispose of these surpluses, many
governments have chosen to subsidize agricultural
expom’ts!
Tinis paper exannines the EEP’s primnnamy goal of
expamnding exports in the context of disposing of
gover-nment-owned wheat, Other research is used
to compar-e the cost of i-educing wheat stocks via
tine EEP with the cost of sinnply destroying the
wheat, Although this paper focuses on wheat,
clnneflybecause wheat has accounted for the bulk
of EEPactivity, the economic pm’inciples used hem-c
camn be generalized to similar’progr-ams for’ other-
commodities,
The secondary goal of influencing EC far-nn pol-
icy is amnalyzedin the frannework of the current
m’ound ofGAIT talks, In 1985, the United States
proposed that all tr’ade- and pm-oduction-distorting
subsidies be ehinnimnated over a 10-year’ period.
Other gr-oups, including tine EC and the Cairns
‘U.S. Department ofAgriculture (May 1988).
‘The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade contains the
international rules governing export subsidies, Article XVI:4
prohibits export subsidies on industrial products that lead to
export sales at lower prices than domestic sales; however, this
does not apply to agricultural goods. U.S. farm interests were
sufficiently powerful to prevent the prohibition on export subsi~
dies from encompassing agricultural goods. Article XVI:3
recommends that export subsidies on agricultural goods be
avoided, but, if they are used, the subsidizingcountry should
not garner a “more-than-equitable”share of tradefor the good.
While European farm interests prevented the extension of the
export subsidy prohibition to agricultural goods in the Tokyo
Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations (1974—79), the mean~
ingof equitable was clarified, For example, a more-than~
equitable share includes the displacement of another country’s
exports. A reference period of the three most recent years in
which normalmarket conditions existed is to be used in deter-
mining an equitable share, See Hufbauer and Erb (1984) for
additional details.
‘Roningen, Sullivan and Wainio (1987) estimate annual welfare
gains forthe United States of slightly less than $4 billion from a
multilateral removal of these measures.39
Group, have offen-ed alter-native proposals! The
primary reason for- changing the current agricul-
tural policies that benefit domestic fan-met-s at the
expense ofconsumers, taxpayers and others is the
cost of such programs. Forexample, the ministen’s
ofthe Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development n’ecentiy stated:
The cost of agricultur-al policies is consider-able,
forgovernrnnent budgets, for consumer’s and for the
econonnyas awhole, Moreover, excessive suppor-t
policies entail an increasing disrortion of connpeti-
tion on won-Id mnar-kets; run counter’ to the pt-mci-
pie ofcomparative advantage which is at tine r-oot
of international tr-ade; and severely damage tIne
situation ofmany developing countries.’
This paper examines EEP’s role in encouraging
successftnl negotiations to hiber’ahize agricultur’al
trade in the GAiT process.
Before examining the issues of export expansion
and trade negotiations, we describe the expon-t
subsidy programs of the United States and Euro-
pean Community and, in the process. pr-ovide
historical background necessary to understand
the EEP’s objectives.
THE FARM POLICY ENVIRO.N.ME.NT
UNDERLYING TIlE EXPORT
E’NHA.NCEMENT PROGHA%’I
The stage for- tlnis export subsidy progr’am was
set by steady losses in the shar-e of wor’ld agricul-
tural trade held by the United States and by paral-
lel EC gains in export shares, Fronn 1977 to 1985,
the U.S. sinare of the world’s net wheat exports
declined fiom 41,9 percent to 28.8 per-cent, while
the EC’s share rose fr-om — 1.6 percent to 15.1 per--
cent.bThese cinanging mar-ket shares can be linked
to EC export subsidies. Chart T shows that tine U.S.
wheat export price gener-ahiy exceeded the subsi-
dized EC expont price betweern 1978 annd T987.’
Since 1983, the gap has tended to widen. EC cx-
port subsidies are respomnsible for this gap because
inter-nal EC prices are farabove U.S. mnar’ket prices.
This EC subsidy is the catalyst for the U.S. export
subsidy program, which is targeted at those coun-
tries where EC-subsidized expor-ts havedisplaced
U.S. exports.
Surplus Production and Govci-nnicnt
ITheu.t Stocks
To under-stamnd the EEP goal ofexpori exparn-
sion, one must examine the U.S. farnn pr-ogn-ams
used to support the production of most cr’ops.
The nnost important consequence of these pro-
gr-anns is that they gener-ate sur-pluses because
pr-ice guar-antees, with the exception of the early
1970s, havebeen above market-cleaning levels.
There are two main instruments of the cr-op pn-o-
grams: loan rates and target prices. Both ar-c price
guarantees that ar-c announced well before
farmers make planting decisions. To par-ticipate irn
these programs, far-mer-s gener-allvhave beern re-
quired to reduce crop acm-cage. For exannple, wineat
farmer-s must set aside 10 per-cent of their- 1989
wheat acreage base to quahil\’ for the wheat price
support program.
The loan rate, set at $2.06 per bushel for- the
1989 wlneat crop, serves as a price floor-. If the mar—
ket pr-ice is lower than $2.06, a farmer-pledges the
wheat crop to the gover-nment as cohlateral in ex-
change for-a “loan” of $2.06 per lnusheh. tfthe price
ofwheat rises above the loan r-ate, the far-nner can
r-epay the loan with interest, recoverthe crop and
sell at the higher nnarket price. Ifthe market price
does not recover-, the farnner defaults onthe
“loan,” thus ceding the cr-op to tine gover’nnnent. By
law, the governnnent keeps the acquired surpluses
oif the mnan-ket until the pr-ice reaches a higher
level, known as the release ptice, at which time
the surpluses can be sold on tine mar’ket.
While the loan rate acts as an explicit price sup-
port, tine target price functions as an explicit in-
come support device and is the final pr-ice that
fat-mer’s receive for their crop. At the emnd ofa crop
year, far’nners receive “deficiency paymemits” equal
to the differ-ence between the target price arnd
either-the market pt-ice or- the loan nate, depending
4See Rossmiller (1988) for an outline of the major features of
the proposals by the United States, the European Community,
the Cairns Group, Japanand Canada. The Cairns Group
consists of Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Indonesia, Malay-
sia, the Philippines, Thailand, Brazil, Uruguay, Argentina,
Columbia, Hungary and Chile,
‘See Wilson (1988), p.S.
EC was a net importer of wheat in that year. EC data have
been calculated for the EC-12 and exclude intra-EC trade.
‘These data are not adjusted for wheat quality and transporta-
tion differentials. Such differentials, however, are relatively
constant and, therefore, do not distort significantly the rising
price gap trend,
6Net wheat exports represent exports minus imports. The nega-
tive marketsharefigure for the EC in 1977 indicates that the40
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orn wlnich is hnigher.’ Table I shows tine target, barn
rate and mnnarket prices sinnce tIne inntroductiomn of
tine tar-get price nneclnarnisrnn irn tine crop ~‘ear end—
imng Junne 30, 1975. For 1988, tine target pr-ice was
$4.38 per’ businel. Sirnce tIne iniginer of tIne rnnar’ket
price arnd loan rate was tine nnnar-ket price of $2.60
per bushel, tIne defjcierncv pavrnnentwas 51.78 per
busInel. Until 1988, tIne deficiency pavmnent rose
tlnroughout the 1980s.
As suggested above, as tIne market pt-ice declirnes
n-dative to the barn rate, farrnnerss firnd it rnnor-e pro-
fitable to sur-r’etncher their-crops to lIne gover-nrnnern
for tine loatn n’ate pr-ice r-atlner’ tinamn sell on the tnnar—
ket. Tinese surplus stocks are accurnnulated 1w the
Corirnnodity Cr-edit Corporatiomn, the age.rncv of tine
U.S. Departrnnernt ofArgicuiture )tJSlJA) charged
witin tine adnnitnistration of tine price support pro—
gm-antis. Cinart 2 shows tine inverse rehatiornslnip
hetweern tine ac.cunnulatiotn ofwheat stocks arnd
tine pt-ice gap rnneasur-ed 1w tine nnanket pr-ice nnnirnus
tine loam rate. Whnen tIneprice gap imncr’eases be-
cause of cr-op slnor’tagesor stt-orng dennand sucin as
irn tine ear-lv 1970s, stocks ar-c n-educed. %‘Vbnern tine
pnce gap tnar’r-ows, and especially if tIne gap is
rnegative, tine accurnnulatiorn of stocks occurs. The
Iarge itncn’ease ir’n wlneat stocks in tine 1980s reflects
tIne relatively snnall price gap.
ihsposing ofGot’ernincnt iI”heat
Stocks
Various progt’ams ar-c used to dispose of tine
stocks tlnat at’e owrned 1w tine govet-rnrnnemnt. Some of
tIne sur-plirs disposal is directed to the dornnestic
nnnarket, but rnnost is directed to foreigrn nnarkets
‘In some years, farmers have received a portion ofthis pay-





through expor-t.” Obviously, the EEP belongs to the
latter categoty.”
More than 100 initiatives, targeting mon-c than 60
countties and 11 commodities have been an-
nounced under the EEP since June 1985. The EEP
functions by giving gover’nnnent-owned surplus
connnnodities at mo cost to pr-ivate U.S. exporters.
Tinis allows them to sell U.S. commodities at prices
tinat ar-c below U.S. nnatket pn-ices in or-der to be
connpetitive with other export-subsidizing coun-
tries.An EEP.~aiesinitiative states the tar’geted
country and the quantity of a specific connmodity
to be sold. Krno~ingtinat a subsidy is available,
private U.S. exporter-s can offer to sell the com-
modity at prices below tIne market cost of acquir--
ing it in the United States. These bids are comitin-
gent upon receivimig the necessary subsidy from
the USDA.
The foreign buyer- nnay accept bids made by
nunnet-ous U.S. exporter-s.The U.S. exporters then
bid against each other to receiye the USDA’s sun-
plus stocks as a payment for the expont subsidy.
During tlnis process, eacin expon-ter states hnow
large a subsidy is required to make the export sale.
For’ example, ifone expom’ter’ r-equests a subsidy of
$30 per torn amnd another r-equests $35 perton for
sale of the same commodity to the same countty,
the USDA would award the subsidy payment to
the lower bidder. Thus, the bid process helps the
USDA get a larget- volume of exports per dollar of
subsidy. if tine exporter’s bid for the subsidy is
successfrrh, tine commodity sale to the foreign
country is made; otherwise, the sale to the for’eign
country is voided. Upon pmoof of shipment and
landirng of the connmoditv in the targeted rnnar-ket,
the expor-ter is paid by the USDA with a genen-ic
commodity cer-tificate in the amount of the bonus.
The certificate can he exchanged for its value in
any of the sur-plus stocks held by the USDA. The
exclnange of certificates for’nnost commodities is
nnade at tine “Posted County Price,”which is r-ep-
r-eserntative of an aver-age local mamket pnice. ‘Fine
exchnamnge of cen-tificates for- wheat is accornnplished
through a uSDA auction.
As shown in table 2, EEP subsidies have in-
cr-eased sitnce their inception in 1985. Total EEP
‘One of the most notable examples of domestic surplusdis-
posal was the 1983 Payment-in-Kind (P1K) programthat gave
surplus commodities to farmers who agreed to limit their pro-
duction, The school milk program, which sells milk at below-
market prices, and programs to distribute other dairy products
to food-stamp recipients are other domestic examples of sur-
plusdisposal policy.
“Another example of surplus disposal through export is the
Food for Peace Program, also known as P.L. 480. The pro-
gram provides surpluses either at no cost or at below-market
prices to low-incomecountries, In an analysis of P.L. 480,
Lutlrell (1982) concluded that the food shipments were largely
a gift that reduced the incentive for food production in the
recipient nations,43
subsidies in fiscal year1986 amounted to $280
million and gr-ew to $995 million in 1988. During
this time, the value ofwheat subsidies gr-ew fi-om
$209 nnillion to 5744 million, Had it not been
slowed by tine sever-c drought in the tlnited States
that reduced the availability of wheat sun-pluses,
EEP gr-owth in 1988would have been even nnor’e
substantial,
lEe European (7oinnnunity’s Export
B.c/linda
While the EEP is of recent origin, the EC’s expon-t
subsidy program has been in ettect since tine
founding of the Connnnon Agn-icultur-al Policy CAP)
in 1962. The progr’am, however-, was not a source
of tr-ade friction with other- agricultural exporting
nations because the EC was an imponter of most
agricultural commodities,The CAP originally was
designed to encourage donnestic production in
Europe following the food shoriages dur-ing and
after World War- Ii. it emicoun-ages commoditypro-
duction by offering a guaranteed price that often
has been significantly higher than the world price.
Because domestic prices generallyhave been
higher- than world prices, the CAP uses a variable
levy to protect EC farmer-s from lower-priced im-
por-ts.’’
Over time, Europeamn far-mnen-s responded to the
higin pr-ice guarantees with greatly increased pr-o-
duction, resulting in large surplus stockt.To dis-
pose of the surpluses, the EC nnakes payments to
exporters, known as export r-estitutiomns or- refunds,
to allow them to sell the highet--priced EC com-
modities at the lower world price. As CAP pr-ice
guarantees have remained above world market
prices, expor-t subsidies have expanded further- to
dispose of the mounting surpluses. Export re-
funds by the EC have gr-own from 54.7 bilbiomn in
1982 to a projected $12.9 billiomn in 1988. Bailey
1988a) states that EC export subsidies for wheat
rose from $365 million in 1985 to an estinnated
51.8 billion in 1988 and that the EEP probably ac-
counted for 35 percent to 40 percemnt of the
imicrease.”
ANALYSIS OF’ THE’ E:EP
%‘I)’nr’ME\’T (IF GOALS ANO
COSTS
The EEP will be judged on the basis of the costs
associated with expandinng exports and inducing
nnegotiations to liberalize agnicultur-e throughout
the won-id. First, we examine tIne efl’ect of the EEP
on exports and assess its costs telative to sinnplv
destroying tine sur-plrrs productiomn. Second, we
exannine tine effect ofthe EEP omi the EC’s willing-
ness to reduce gover-nnnentab involvement inn agri-
cuitur-al pn-oduction and tiade,
EEP anti the Goal 0/Export
.Expansion
Tine primary goal of the EEP is to incr-ease the
volume of U.S. agricultural expon-ts. Wheat exports
have irncreased slnar’ply simue 1985, tine fir-st year of
the EEP, gr’owirng about 60 percernt in 1987. Not
only has tine level of exports expanded, but the
U.S. shan-e ofthe world’s wheat rnnar’ket imncr-eased
from 28.8 percent in 1985 to an estimated 41.6
percent in 1988. To what extent can the rise in
exports be attributed to the EEP? The following
discussion highligints many of the empit-ical dif-
ficulties involved in answeringthis questiorn arid
discusses omne study that has addressed this ques-
tion.
The EEP, as an export subsidy progr-amn, will
iricn-ease the quantity of exports by driving down
tine price ofexports. As Belongia 11986) has noted,
however-, expont r’evenues will not necessarily rise
as tine quantity of expon-ts increases~ ,‘:~ Ifthe world
dennand for wheat is imnelastic, then the EEP would
cause a r-eduction in export revenues. Ther-efor-e,
tine price elasticity of export demarnd for U.S.
wheat is a crucial variable for determining the
overall effects of the EEP.
Estimates of the price elasticity of export de-
nnand for- U.S. wineat cover a wide rannge ofvalues.
Gardiner and Dixit 11987) sunnmarized studies over
the past two decades that estinnated tinis elasticity.
“Thevariable levy taxes imports at the rate of the difference
between the world price and the EC threshold price. For exam-
ple, in March 1987, the EC threshold price for wheat was $8.53
per bushel while the world price was $1.95 per bushel, Im-
porters would have been required to pay a levy of $6.58 ($8.53
—$1.95). These payments represented a large income source
for the EC when it was a majorimporter.
“The EEP is only one device that the United States allegedly
has used to influence the EC. The Farm Bill of 1985 sharply cut
the crop loan rate which allowed the market price to plunge
while maintaining a high level ofincome support for farmers.
This cut in market prices led to higher export subsidy costs for
the EC. in addition, the 1985 Farm Bill introduced the practice
of marketing loans for cotton and rice, The marketing loans
also led to lower world prices whilemaintaining farmers’ in-
come. Cotton and rice, however, are not exported in any signifi-
cant quantities by the EC.
“See Belongia (1986) for a discussion of the profitability of
farming and the pitfalls of using export volume as an indicator
of the farm sector’s economic health,44
The shot-n-run that is, one yearor less) pt-ice elas-
ticity ranged fronn —0.14 to —3.13 with an average
of —0.72, wlnile the long-nun that is, mon-c than
one year-) price elasticity ranged fl-ow —023 to
—6.72 with an average of —1.93. The lack of a con-
sensus estinnate pnecludes a definitive assessment
about the desin-abilitv of EEP; however-, some sug-
gestive evidence can he assembled,
Witln 14 of the 17 estimates of the shor-t-run
pr-ice elasticity in the inelastic range, evidence
suggests that irncr-easimig export subsidies will de-
ct-ease export revenues in the sinort-run. A one-
tinne, acr-oss-the-hoard subsidy is clearly unwar-
r-anted irn this case.”
If tIne export subsidy continues, then the long-
run price elasticity is r-elevant. A definitive conclu-
sion is no longer’ possible. The studies suggest that
the long-run price elasticity is likely to be elastic. If
so, then export r-evenues will increase in the long-
n-un due to the expont subsidies. With export reve-
nues likely decreasing in the shon-t-r-un and in-
cteasing in the long-run, additional imnfornnation
about the magnitudes of the export revenues and
subsidy costs overtime amid the appropriate dis-
count rate is required befor-e a definitive conclu-
sion can be reached.
In fact, information requirements are even
greater. An implicit assumption of the elasticit
discussion is that the EC, as well as other countries,
do not attempt to counter-act the EEP. The parallel
rise in U.S. and EC export subsidies, as well as an-
ecdotal evidence presented later, reveals this as-
sumption is not appropriate. in addition, the EEP is
targeted to specific markets where U.S. exports have
been displacedby the EC. Thus, information is
required about the price elasticity ofexport de-
mand forspecific markets. Consensus estimates
concerning specific matkets are simply not avail-
able. Finally, other factors that influence the level of
U.S. wheat exports must be accounted for.
Despite tine difficulty of estimating EEP’s effect
on export r-evenues, the EEP clearly has boosted
tinevolume ofwheat exports by eliminating the
EC’s export price advantage. Since 1985, the U.S.
expont pr-ice has been 530—540 per ton higher- than
the subsidized EC export price, a difference offset
by the aver-age EEP subsidy ofapproximately $33.
The effect ofthis subsidy, along with four- other-
factors that influenced U.S. wheat exports over the
past three years, were analyzed by Bailey )1988b,
These other- factor-s were the lower price suppont
loan rates for- wheat, reductions in the yields of
connpeting exporters, increased imports by the
Soviet Union and the Peoples Republic of China
not attributable to the EEP and finally the lower
value of the dollar-. Other- factors that influence
wheat exports, such as world economic health
and production in innpor-ting countries, were not
evaluated. Bailey found that the EEP was respornsi-
ble for about one-third of the increase in wheat
exports from 1985 to 1987 attt-ibutable to the five
factors.” The EEP was responsible for roughly a
305 million bushel increase in wheat exports over
1986/87 and 1987/88. Over- this same period, the
cost of the EEP subsidy given to exporters for
wheat sales was approximately $1.24 billion.#
These estimates translate to an approximate
cost of $4.08 for every bushel ofincreased exports.
The average U.S. Gulf export price for wheat over
these two years was only $3.16. tn terms of its pri-
mary goal, the EEP incr-eased exports, but it did so
at a high cost in the short-run. Destroying the
goveroment-owned stocks, which entails an op-
portunity cost of approximately $3.16 per bushel,
would be a more cost-effective form of sun-plus
rennoval than the EEP with a cost of $4.08 per
bushel.’
‘4Using a modelof international wheat markets, Sharples (1984)
simulated the 1983 effects of an across~the-board$34 per ton
($93/bushel) U.S. subsidy on its wheat exports. A specific goal
was to compare the costs of using export subsidies to reduce
surplus stocks with using the payment-in-kind acreage-
reduction program. Assuming the EC counter-subsidized to
maintain its existing volume ofwheat exports, the U.S. subsidy
would have caused a 300 million bushel increase in U.S. ex-
ports, which represents a2 0percent increase above the level
of unsubsidized exports. Thedirect budget costwould have
totaled $1.6 billion or approximately $5.30 for each additional
bushel of wheat exported. A less costly alternative would have
been for the government to buy the additional 300 million
bushels at the existing $3.65 loan rate and then destroy it.
“The lower foreign-exchange value of the dollar, which might be
expected to have price effects similarto an across-the-board
subsidy, accounted for little of the increase in wheat exports.
and 1987/88 was estimated because year by year cost data
were not available, Theshare oftotal EEP wheat sales
(through August 4, 1988) made in the two years was approxi-
mately 85 percent. The total market value of the wheat subsi-
dies given to exporters through August 4, 1988 was $1.46
billion, The two-year cost of wheat subsidies therefore was
estimated at $1.24billion ($1.46billion times 85 percent).
“Theavailability of surplus commodities is another important
factor in the EEP which became apparent in the droughtyear
of 1988. When government stocks of wheat are depleted by
droughtor byotherfactors, theEEP program would be forced
to reduce its activity. Such irregularity makes the program less
reliablefrom the perspective of importing countries, The reac-
tion of importers likely would be to diversify sources and reduce
reliance on a single export source. In addition, the changes in
the EEP possibly prevent the full impact of the rising exports
from the higher price elasticities of demand in the long run from
occurring.
“The costof the wheat subsidy for the two crop years 1986/8745
EEP and the Goal ofLiberalizing
Agriculture Worldwide
In addition to incr-easing exports, the EEP is
being used to pr-essur-e the EC to hbetalize its agni-
cultural pr-oduction and trade policies. By increas-
ing the costs ofthe EC’s agricultunal suppon-t pro-
grams, the United States hopes to induce the
Eur-opean Community to negotiate major reduc-
tions in these programs.” The political natur-e of
the agricultural prngrams ofboth the United States
and the European Community preclude any
definitive conclusions about the response of tine
EC to the EEP in the long run; however-, insights
from strategic trade theory and the observed initial
EC responses that are identified below suggest the
EEP has been ineffective.”
In a strategic environment, a small number- of
economic agents make interdependent decisions.”
A decision by one agent can alter the costs and
benefits facing another- agent. Thus, agents at-
tempt to judge the response of their rivals before
determining the best cour-se ofaction. Contrary to
aworid of perfect competition with many agents
each too small to influence the market outcome,
agricultural trade policy can be viewed as a strate-
gic environment that can be altered by gover-n-
mental decisions. Obviously, the United States and
the EC are major decisionmakers in this environ-
ment.
Subsidies play an important role in strategic
trade policy. Export subsidies have been recom-
mended for strategic industries that are expected
to earn additional returns sufficient to exceed the
total cost of the subsidy. Strategic tnade policy is
controver-sial for- a number of reasons, one of
which is that strategic trade policy tends to create
an adversarial situation between countries.”
Countries affected advet-sely are inclined to re-
spond with their owmn subsidies. Mutually destruc-
tive tiade war-s are a distinct possibility. Inn fact,
r-ecent developmnents in w’orid agricultur-al tr-ade
are chan-acterized as part of a tr-ade war-.” Without
question, both U.S. and EC export subsidies for
wheat have increased rapidly in recent year-s.
Paarlbeng’s 11988) recounting ofthe trade war
between the United States and the EC provides a
nunnben- of incidents that tend to reinforce the
pr-eceding discussion. In January 1983, tIne United
States subsidized the sale of I million tons of
wheat flour- to E~’pt to under-cut subsidized offer-
ings by the EC. To pr-event the EC fi-om buying
back the nnarket, the United States forced E~’pt to
agree not to import wheat flour- from any non-U.S.
supplier- until June 1934. In the short i-un, the
United States displaced the EC sales ofwheat flout’
to E~’pt. The EC, however-, responded by subsidiz-
ing exports of320,000 tons of unmilled wheat to
E~”pt in spring 1983 and new subsidized wheat
sales to lran, Syria, Libya and Algeria. The EC also
began connpeting in China and Latin America. In
addition, it reached an agr-eement with E~’pt in
October 1983 on future subsidized sales.
One of the major problems of the EEP in liberal-
izing agricultur-e is that mixed signals are being
sent to the EC and other agricultural nations. The
U.S. proposals ar-c a highly publicized initiative to
stimulate a cooperative search to r-efon-m agricul-
ture through GATI. At the same time, the retalia-
ton’ challenges to European-subsidized export
sales can be termed “non-cooperative activisnn.”
Tanger-mann 119851 argues that the U.S. expor’t
subsidies will be coutnterproductive in achieving a
reduction of EC agricultural subsidies. His r-easons
are both politically and economically based. First,
the EC’s costs ofmatching the U.S. subsidies are
relatively small. If U.S. subsidies had reduced
world grain prices by 10 per-cent in 1982, the EC
“The rising costs of the EC’s agricultural programs have already
lead to some reductions in price supports. In 1984, the EC
imposed dairy quotas and began charging farmers who ex-
ceeded their quotas. More recently, the EC has staled its
willingness to reducegrain support prices if grain production
exceeds 160 millionmetric tons, The relationship of these cuts
to the EEP, however, is unknown.
“Strategictrade theory hasbecome popular because of recent
developments that have focused on the importance ofecono-
miesof scale, production experience and technological change
as determinants oftrade patterns. These determinants raise
the possibility that productive resources such as labor and
capital can earn higher returns in some industriesthan others
and that certain sectors generatebenefits that accrue toother
sectors. Both possibilities can be used tojustify an activistuse
and increase income domestically. Strategic tradetheory
combines international trade theory and political theory to
explain the dynamics of trade policies and assist in designing
policies that are in a nation’s best interest,
“See Richardson (1986) for a more lengthy discussion of strate-
gic trade policy.
“Subsidies for research and development have been recom-
mended for strategic industries whose competitive positions
depend on generating technological advances, In addition to
creating an adversarial situation between countries, there are
concerns that special interest groups will capture the benefits
from the subsidies at the expense of the nation,
2
2
5ee Lochhead (1988) for a characterization of this trade war.
of trade policies to influence domestic aswell asforeign activity46
could lnave maintained its export volume by am
irncrease inn its agricultural budget of only 0.8 per—
cernt. Second, since tine Urnited States can be por-
trayedas tine enemy, there will be nnuch political
support for- expendittmnes to counter-act tine U.S.
subsidies,
Additional doubts about the effectiverness and
wisdom of waging full-scale trade war- have been
raised by Paarlberg 11988), Since tine Umnited States
inas much larger foreign mar-kets to defetnd,
Paan-iber-g esninnates tinat it would have to outspend
the Eut-opean Connmunity by 50 percent in a full-
scale war simply to retain its market share. In ad-
dition, since somnie ofthe U.S. rrrajor foreigrn cotni—
petitors an-c also large importer’s, a full-scale war-
would likely lead to foreign retaliation in tine form
of impot-t restrictions that would he costly to both
the United States and the other- countries. As a
major’ impor-ter froni tine United States, tIne EC is inn
a position to make a full-scale war mor-e costly for
tine United States.
In addition, tine U.S. negotiating positiomn inn
GA’fl’ is weakened because the United States is
doing the same thing tinat is the source of its jr-rita-
tiomn with the EC.” For- example, tine Cairns Group,
a negotiatimng coalitiorn of 13 agticulttitally oriernted
nations, has objected strenuously to the contin-
tied irse of agricultural export subsidies.’~Much
irritation stems directly from the economic conse-
quences of increasing stmbsidies by the United
States arid tine EC. Olesorn 1987) has noted that
tine U.S. and EC policies have caused the price of
wheat to fall, imposing nnnajor losses on such gr-ain
exporter-s as Canada, Austr’alia and Argentina.
Str-ategic tr-ade theory suggests that the lack of
ciarity about U.S. polic will inhibit tine desired
foreign r-esponse. The United States is willing to
subsidize exports; however, it maintains that a
liberalized agricultural system is a goal. A basic
question, whicin focuses on the ct-edibility of tine
U.S. proposal, is whether tine goal of a connplete
liber-alization of agr-icultur-al production and trade
in the United,States is feasible politically.
Producers of agricultural products in the United
States inave been beneficiaries of price support
programs since the 1930s.” ‘l’hese progrannns pro-
vide substantial bemnelits to tine far-rn sector-.
Roningen, Sullivan and Wainio 1987) estimate that
a multilateral liher’ahzation would cause a loss of
U.S. producers’ surplus ofslightly less than $10
billion. Thus, ivhether the U.S. Congr-ess would
actually support legislation for- the complete liber-
alization of agricultural production and tr-ade is
uncertain, ‘This uncertainty about the true U.S.
position likely deter-s the EC fi’om agreeing to the
stated U.S. position.
CONCLUSION
The initial evidence fi’om the Export Enhamnce-
rnnent Progr-am, aitinough farfrom conclusive,
raises doubts about tine wisdom of U.S. agricultural
export subsidies for wheat arid, by implication, all
connnnodities. While the EEP has contributed to
irncreased U.S. wineat exports, the cost of disposirng
of the resultant sun-plus, even ifone ignores the
escalating U.S.-Eur-opean Community trade war’, is
higher- than the cost of simply destroying the
wheat in the short-r-un. In addition, the U.S. has
imposed costs on agricultur-al exportets tinr-ougln-
out the world,
Strategic trade theory arid the EC’s initial re-
sponse to the export pnogram suggest that the EC
will be more likely to escalate the tr’ade war tinan
agree to U.S. proposals for eliminating all
production- arid tr-ade-distor-ting agriculturai poli-
cies. This, however, does not rule out the possibil-
ity that negotiations to liberalize agriculture ar-c
doomed, but rather- suggests that the EEP will be
ineffective, and possibly counterproductive, inn
affecting the EC’s position.
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